Abstract

This study, “suppression of Pakistani media during Musharraf, Zardari and Nawaz’s regimes in the post-2000 scenario," was analyzed through the prism of Authoritarian and Framing Theories by taking generic frames from Semetko & Valkenburg Model-2000 and some other issue-specific frames. Quantitative and qualitative content analyses with a distinct coding scheme were applied. SPSS Version-21 was utilized for descriptive statistics, variance, and multiple regression tests of the quantitative data with a sampling frame of 2880 of four newspapers.  The qualitative data was examined with Nvivo software. Results disclosed that categories revealing media suppression dominated with 1404 (69.50%) items of the total 2020, while those suggesting media facilitation were only 538 (26.63%). The highest media suppression was reported during Musharraf’s era. A relatively less significant difference was observed between Zardari and Nawaz regimes. Results partially supported the hypothesis of significant difference in media treatment by all three regimes.

Key Words

Suppression, Violence, Coercion, Regulation, Facilitation

Introduction

Since the beginning of formal newspapers in 16th century, the press established its role and worth in human society, which is getting even more important day by day in the advanced shape of media. The contemporary press-government affairs of inevitable and regular antagonism and mutual interdependence have become a constant concern for scholars, thinkers, and the ruling class (Yüksel, 2013). It also nurtured the four normative press theories of Authoritarianism, Libertarianism, Communism, and Social Responsibility. The scientific and critical approaches in mass communication research after the 1950s led to more theoretical approaches (Nordenstreng, 1997). 

The importance of the media in modern times has been recognized since the 18th century when its original form, "press," was termed as the Fourth Estate (McGraw, 2008). Media now speak for citizens and reports about those who hold key socio-political positions (Schultz, 1998) and play a watchdog role to keep regimes answerable to the masses (Woodring & James, 2012). Many times, regimes and media turn as each other’s necessities. The media have a constant thirst for news about state’s institutions to ?ll airtime and newspaper pages; the government agencies need news-outlets to showcase their legitimacy and foster relationships with the public (Akhtar & Pratt, 2013).  So this complex and ever-changing bond is based on media-government antagonism as well as mutual interdependence. 

Since 1947, Pakistan faced many sudden political upheavals, which not only cast very negative effects on the entire social fabric but also affected the press very badly. Being a leftover piece of the fighting Press in British India against the Imperial Rule and having owned a distinct identity of “Muslim Press" while crusading for a separate Muslim state, the early press in Pakistan inherited the legacy of constant struggle and disparagement. This distinguishing character of the pioneer press caused a quick rift with the early regimes after 1947. Besides, the early press had ingested stimulation from Quaid-i-Azam, who was an ardent advocate of individual liberties and freedom of the press. On March 12, 1947, a few months before the creation of Pakistan, Quaid-i-Azam articulated his vision regarding the fundamental duties of the press as such:

"You have great power. You can guide and misguide people. You can make or mar the biggest personality. The power of the press is really great, but you must remember that this power, which you are wielding, is a trust. Look upon it as a great trust, and remember that you are guiding honestly and sincerely the progress and welfare of your nation. At the same time, I expect you to be completely fearless. If I go wrong, or for that matter, the League goes wrong in any direction of its policy or program, I want you to criticize it…” (Khan, 2008).

Despite such a firm commitment, mala-fide intentions had surfaced to gag the press even during his life time. The Quaid’s speech of August 11, 1947, was subjected to censorship, as the Government’s Secretary had advised the press not to print its portion about individual liberties and minorities’ rights. It was the first-ever “Press Advice” in Pakistan’s history (Niazi, 1986). After Quaid's death on September 11, 1948, the Public Safety Ordinance was enacted in October 1948, which was legitimized as Public Safety Act in 1952. The Civil & Military Gazette was the first-ever newspaper that was banned on May 13, 1949. It never fully recovered from the blow (Rahman, 2017). 

From 1947 to 1954, 31 newspapers were proscribed in Punjab only. It was officially disclosed to the Constituent Assembly that around 50 newspapers had been warned in 1953 and 1954. Pre-censorship, press advice system, and all other techniques of choking the press prevailed during Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad and President Iskander Mirza's eras. President Ayub Khan further tightened screws over the press with the introduction of the Press & Publication Ordinance (PPO) in 1960 and 1963. His regime took over the Progressive Papers Limited (PPL) in 1959. The press was corrupted and split into two distinct groups i.e. Pakistan Newspapers Editors Conference (PNEC) headed by Altaf Hussain and the Council of Press Editors (CPE) led by Hamid Nizami. Yahya Khan’s era was a replica of previous regimes for the Press in Pakistan. The civilian ruler Z. A. Bhutto could not tolerate any sort of criticism, directed clampdown against the press by closing critical newspapers, jailed some editors & publishers, and nationalized the Pakistan Press International (Zeeshan, 2012).

During Zia-ul-Haq’s regime (1977-1988), the Press & Publication Ordinance was a draconian addition to the anti-press laws during Zia’s era… (IMS, 2009), which remained as the strongest instrument for the governments to close down newspapers and silence the press (Cull, Culbert & Welch, 2003).The Registration of Printing Presses & Publications Ordinance (RPPO) in late 1988 eased some press restrictions. During the first term of Benazir Bhutto (1988-1990), the press gained some strength in terms of freedom and use of new technology.  However, during their short rule in the 1990s, both civilian leaders, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif made all-out efforts to suppress and corrupt the press and journalists. That is why, when General Pervez Musharraf ousted Nawaz Sharif through a military coup on October 12, 1999, hardly any voice was raised by the media in his support (Kavita, 2000). 

The onslaught of satellite TV channels and internet-based social media changed the entire edifice of Pakistani media in the new millennium. Even the strong military ruler General Musharraf had to open up the gateway for the private media (Peshimam, 2013). Despite this revolution, the media witnessed the same environment as their precursor, the press, had faced in the past. This study evaluates suppression of the media by the regimes of Musharraf, Zardari, and Nawaz Sharif.

Literature Review

Media-regime linkage has been analyzed from various theoretical perspectives in different socio-political and economic settings across the world. Yüksel (2013) suggested the Cascade model arguing that political actors, media, and the public mutually influence and interact with each other at different levels and under certain conditions. Under the framework of the General Theory of Relationship Management, Pratt & Akhter (2016) viewed that publics expect mutuality in their relationships with an organization, and this reciprocity, maintains and fosters relationship and association within a society. Through the Structural-functional approach, Iqbal (2011) posited that all social institutions, including media, work as sub-systems and are parts of the whole in a given social structure; media affect all other social entities, get influenced in return, and the institution of politics is the main predictor in media and state relations in Pakistan.

Methew (2016) cited four types of media regulation i.e. Complete Regulation in countries like Turkey, China, Saudi Arabia, etc., Co-regulation as in Australia; statutory Regulation in India and Pakistan; and Self-regulation in E.U. states. Chomsky (2002) posited the media's propaganda model, techniques of mind control, and behavior change with disinformation by regimes and big enterprises through propaganda or with the power of advertisers and sponsors. Coronel (2010) traced the idea of the media's watchdog role up to 200 years ago as the “Fourth Estate” to prevent regimes from the misuse of power and authority.  Ali (2005) and Mezzera & Sial (2010) cited different techniques of Pakistani regimes to suppress the media like anti-press laws, seizing the media outlets, creation of official media groups, direct control of news agencies, distribution of newsprint quota, press advice system, censorship, use of official ads as a tool, cash prizes for pro-regime journalists, allocation of official positions to some media persons; the dispensation of monetary and other benefits to influential journalists. 

Riaz (2008) judged journalists' perception about the government’s influence on print media content in Pakistan due to official advertisement and reported that the majority agreed to the notion that the newspapers getting more official ads offer more pro-government coverage. Yusuf & Schoemaker (2013) argued that the 2013-elections were held amid a vibrant, outspoken, and diversified media, despite devastated attacks of the militant groups. The media gained in terms of empowering diverse voices with the opening of regional TV/FM channels and proliferation of social media platforms, but their watchdog, agenda setting, and gate-keeping roles were decreased due to many reasons.

Having faced all oddities in journalistic career, Aziz & Hasan (1991) extracted dual meanings from the title of the work-Stop Press-A Life in Journalism: First…the editor includes a lately arrived story in the space left over under the Stop Press heading. Second, in the context of a volatile political situation and infinite restraints on media, it stands for the incessant attempts made to prevent a journalist from expressing his opinion in countries like Pakistan, where political upheavals and military coups are the order of the day. 

Khurshid (1963) traced a brief history of journalism and the invention of the printing press in Europe and in the Sub-continent. As a working journalist, Niazi (1987), in his book “The Press in Chains," accumulated acts of the British Raj before 1947 and the successive Pakistani civilian & martial law rulers to make the journalists subservient and restrict press freedom to the lowest. By “The Press Under Siege” he connoted “the Pakistani press and journalists community as under constant threat and a soft target of the non-state actors, some of them sponsored by state institutions like political activists, students organizations, religious outfits, ethnic & sectarian bands, and other pressure groups”. The Web of Censorship (1994) is a sequel to Zamir Niazi’s early work to record the sufferings and humiliations faced by the press and journalists in Pakistan at the hands of various civilian and military regimes. 




Theoretical Framework 

This study was conducted in the framework of Authoritarian and Framing theories. One of the four traditional theories stated by Siebert in 1950, Authoritarian Theory, holds that the press must be all-times loyal and obedient to the regime to maintain order in society and achieve its political objectives. It further states that the press must abstain from any sort of criticism over the regime, its functionaries, and the prevailing societal order, and in case of any violation, the regime reserves the right to punish the press by imposing fines, closing newspapers, or confining journalists. 

According to Goffman (1974) frames are a schema of interpretations used by individuals to contextualize the information. Entman (1993) mentioned four key functions of media framing, i.e., selecting some aspects of a perceived reality, making them more salient in a communicating text to promote a particular problem definition, a causal interpretation, a moral evaluation, and a treatment recommendation. Further classified as, “the Media Frames-have the central idea of communication that provides meaning to everyday reality and the Individual Frames are the mentally stored clusters of ideas that guide individual’s processing of information” (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987). 

Iyengar (1992) argued that “episodic frames” portray public issues with concrete instances while “thematic frames” put the public issues with some more general contexts. Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) discovered frames like attribution of responsibility, conflict, economic consequence, human interest, and morality. Pertinent to the framing analysis, “Slant” means a particular way of showing or looking at something. Cambridge Dictionary defines slant as "to present information in a particular way especially showing one group of people, one side of an argument, etc., in such a positive or negative way that is unfair".  




Statement of the Problem

Treatment of the media in Pakistan during the regimes of Perviz Musharraf, Asif Zardari, and Nawaz Sharif in the changing media landscape after 2000 requires ample attention, which is the sole purpose of this study. No specific study on this particular topic has so far been made in Pakistan that requires explanation through the proper application of a scientific inquiry to which an effort has been made in this study.




Objectives of the Study

The main objective of this study was to explore the coverage of four selected newspapers regarding suppression of the media during the regimes of Musharraf, Zardari, and Nawaz. 




Significance of the Study

This study will be significant to find out which regime highly suppressed the media and how the issue was framed in the Pakistani press. It will be helpful to explore relevant issues and topics in this area in the future and will be used for literature review in future researches. It will also be significant for journalists and media workers and as a guideline for policymakers, government officials, and media houses. 




Research Questions   

RQ 1: How much coverage was provided to the suppression of Media in Pakistan during the regimes of Musharraf, Asif Zardari, and Nawaz Sharif?

RQ 2: Which of the three governments suppressed the media and focused very much on media related legislation, rules & regulations?




Hypotheses       

H1: It is more likely that the military regime of Musharraf suppressed the media more than that of the civilian regimes of Asif Zardari and Nawaz Sharif.

H2: It is more likely that there existed a significant difference in treatment of the media by the regimes of Musharraf, Zardari & Nawaz”.

Research Methodology

Quantitative and qualitative content techniques were used in this work. The entire 399 newspapers (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, 2018) regularly published in Pakistan during all the three regimes constituted population for quantitative analysis. A mix of English Dailies Dawn, the news, and Urdu Dailies Nawa-i-Waqt and Express was selected through purposive sampling. The time frame included 15 years (05 years for each regime) starting from January 1, 2003, till June 2, 2018. To avoid over or under-representation due to daily-basis and cyclic variation in content, the sample size was kept fairly large. Data was collected from all months of the year through the constructed week sampling. Only front, back, Op-ed, and Inner pages were selected for analysis. Headline and Intro/lead of items was taken as the recording unit and the whole story as the contextual unit. Categories were coded through the content categorization scheme. Relevant thematic (generic) frames were taken from Semetko & Valkenburg Model (2000). Some other topic-specific frames were also incorporated.

To ascertain the social, syntactical, and semantic context of information in reports of opted local and global media bodies, the method of Narratology- story-telling or narrative in the text (Newbold et al., 2002) was also applied in Qualitative analysis. As suggested by Hsieh & Shannon (2005), qualitative data was reduced to concepts by creating categories and conceptual maps for problem examination and comparison of results (Schreier, 2012).  Mayring (2000)’s Inductive Approach was adopted for specific examination of categories and patterns (topics/issues/events) to a broader sort of conclusion. For qualitative analysis, relevant reports of two Global Media Watchdogs, i.e., Reporters Without Borders (RSF) and International Freedom of Expression Exchange (IFEX), and four Pakistani organs i.e., All Pakistan Newspapers Society (APNS), Council of Pakistan Newspapers Editors (CPNE), Pakistan Federal Union of Journalists (PFUJ) and Pakistan Press Foundation (PPF) were selected. Quantitative data was coded in nominal form and inserted into the SPPS statistical data-sheet, and preliminary descriptive statistics were carried out to form tables and graphs. Chi-square and ANOVA tests were applied to test hypotheses. For qualitative analysis, Nvivo::12 Plus software was used to make nodes, codes, and maps to explain relationships among relevant concepts. 

A- Quantitative Analysis

The total selected sample was 2880 days (102 weeks). Newspaper genres about the issue were appeared on 1289 (44.76%) days, and no relevant genres were published by respective newspapers on 1591 (55.24%) days. A total number of 2020 genres appeared on 1289 days, with an average of 1.57 genres per day.




 

Table A-1. Regime-wise Frequency

Regime	Frequency	Percent
Musharraf	761	37.7
Zardari	608	30.1
Nawaz	651	32.2
Total	2020	100.0

 




Table A-1 showed that out of 2020 newspapers genres, the largest number i.e. 761 (37.7%), was published in Musharraf’s period followed by 651 (32.2%) items during Nawaz era, and the minimum number of 607 (30.1%) in Zardari’s regime. Event-based items were 1086 (53.8%), whereas issue-based items numbered 934 (46.2%) of the total.




 

Table A-2. Regime-wise Impulsion

Impulsion	Regime	Frequency	Percent
Event-based	Musharraf	433	39.9
	Zardari	323	29.7
	Nawaz	330	30.4
	Total	1086	100.0
Issue-based	Musharraf	328	35.1
	Zardari	285	30.5
	Nawaz	321	34.4
	Total	934	100.0

 




Table A-2 showed that out of 1086 event-based genres, the highest number i.e. 433 (39.9%) was, appeared during Musharraf’s regime, followed by 330 (30.4%) in Nawaz era and 323 (29.7%) during Zardari’s rule. Out of 934 issue-based genres, the largest number, 328 (35.1%) was published during Musharraf’s regime, followed by 321 (34.4%) in the Nawaz era and 285 (30.5%) occurred during Zardari’s period.




 

Table A-3. Source-wise Coverage

News Source	Regime	Frequency	Percent
Official	Musharraf	70	66.7
	Zardari	26	24.8
	Nawaz	9	8.6
Private	Musharraf	691	36.1
	Zardari	582	30.4
	Nawaz	642	33.5
	G. Total	2020	100.0

 




Table A-3 indicated that out of a total of 2020 items, the largest number of 1950 (94.80%) genres was obtained from private news sources, and only 105 (5.20%) items were quoted from official sources. Out of 105 official-based genres, 70 (66.7%) were quoted during the Musharraf era, followed by 26 (24.8%) in Zardari era and only 9 (8.6%) during the Nawaz era. A downward trend was noted in the decline of reliance over the official news sources.




 

Table A-4. Topics/Issues Covered

Topics/Issues	Frequency	Percent
Coercion	473	23.42
Violence	563	27.87
Facilitation	304	15.05
Regulation	120	5.94
Responsible	234	11.58
Irresponsible	248	12.28
Other	78	3.86
Total	2020	100

 




Table A-4 indicated that the genres revealing violence against the media dominated the coverage with 563 (27.87%) items, followed by 473 (23.42%) genres reporting coercion. Media facilitation occurred in 304 (15.05%) genres, irresponsible media in 248 (12.28%) items, and responsible media in 234 (11.58%) items. Categories like coercion, violence, regulation, and irresponsible media all predicting media coercion dominated the coverage with 1404 (69.50%) of the total 2020, and thus provided an answer to Research Question-1.

 

Frequency of Genres

The analysis also showed that the issue was largely covered in the format of news stories making up 1529 (75.70%) of the total. Other formats used were, Column 250 (12.38%), letters-to-editor 116 (5.74%), Editorials, 82 (4.06%), and “Other Items” 18 (0.89%) only.




 

Table A-5. Frames in Items

Frame	Value	Count	Percent
Government’s Responsibility	1	453	22.4%
Media’s Responsibility	2	270	13.4%
Conflict	3	52	2.6%
Facilitation	4	212	10.5%
Pro-government	5	73	3.6%
Anti-government	6	604	29.9%
Pro-Media	7	147	7.3%
Anti-Media	8	209	10.3%
Total		2020	100%

 




Table A-5 denoted that frames about worst media treatment dominated the coverage as; anti-government 604 (29.9%), government’s responsibility 453 (22.4%), media’s responsibility 270 (13.4%), and anti-media 209 (10.3%). Items predicting worst and deplorable treatment of the media appeared as 1588 (78.61%) of the total, and genres envisaging conducive media treatment were 432 (21.39%) of the entire 2020 items.

 

Testing of Hypothesis-1

The first hypothesis presuming that Musharraf suppressed the media more than the two civilian regimes of Asif Zardari & Nawaz Sharif was tested with one-way ANOVA. Regimes were taken as dependent variables, and topics/issues/events were made as independent variables to determine the degree of variance as given below:




 

Table A-6.  One-Way ANOVA to Detect Mean Values of Groups

Regime	N	Mean	Std. Devi.	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Min.	Max.
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Musharraf	761	2.61	1.638	.059	2.49	2.73	1	7
Zardari	608	3.17	1.849	.075	3.03	3.32	1	7
Nawaz	651	3.50	1.993	.078	3.35	3.65	1	7
Total	2020	3.07	1.860	.041	2.99	3.15	1	7

 




According to Table A-6, the mean difference between the three regimes was; Musharraf 2.61, Zardari 3.17, and Nawaz 3.50, respectively. Standard deviation from the mean values appeared as Musharraf, 1.638, Zardari, 1.849, Nawaz, 1.993, and Standard error within the groups was; Musharraf, .059, Zardari, .075, and Nawaz, .078, respectively. The mean value during Musharraf regime was the lowest i.e. 2.61, which meant that the treatment of media remained the worst during Musharraf’s regime as compared to two other regimes.




 

Table A-7. ANOVA Test for Difference between and within the Groups

Difference	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	286.841	2	143.421	43.207	.000
Within Groups	6695.137	2017	3.319
Total	6981.978	2019

 




In Table A-7, ANOVA test showed the Sum of Squares between the groups as 286.841, the degree of freedom (df) as 2, the Mean Square value 143.421, and the F value as 43.207 with a significance of 0.000, which indicated a significant difference. 




 

 

Table A-8.  Robust Tests of Means’ Equality (H-I)

	Statistica	df1	df2	Sig.
Welch	44.565	2	1285.550	.000
Brown-Forsythe	42.476	2	1882.146	.000
a. Asymptotically F distributed.

 




Table A-8 indicates Welch and Brown-Forsythe Robust Tests of Means’ Equality of the hypothesis. Results indicated a significance value of .000 which means significant difference. ANOVA test of H-1 proved that media treatment remained worst during Musharraf’s rule as compared to Zardari and Nawaz regimes. However, the situation remained worst in all the three regimes. Hence H-1 is supported.

 

Testing of Hypothesis-II

The second hypothesis of the study was: “It is more likely that there existed significant difference in treatment of the media by all the three regimes of Musharraf, Zardari & Nawaz". To know the difference, Tukey Post Hoc Test of Multiple Comparisons was conducted. Regimes were placed as independent variables, and the categories of topics/issues/events were taken as independent variables as shown in tables below.




 

Table A-9. Tukey Post Hoc Tests of Multiple Comparisons

	(I) Name of Regime	(J) Name of Regime	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Tukey HSD	Musharraf	Zardari	-.563*	.099	.000	-.80	-.33
		Nawaz	-.888*	.097	.000	-1.12	-.66
	Zardari	Musharraf	.563*	.099	.000	.33	.80
		Nawaz	-.325*	.103	.005	-.57	-.08
	Nawaz	Musharraf	.888*	.097	.000	.66	1.12
		Zardari	.325*	.103	.005	.08	.57

 




Table A-9 describes One-way ANOVA test which showed the Mean Difference (I-J) scores for Comparison of Musharraf’s regime with Zardari and Nawaz regimes as; Zardari -.563^*, and Nawaz -.888^*. Standard Error fell as; Zardari .099, Nawaz Sharif .097. Significance of difference was 0.000, which indicated a significant difference between comparison of Musharraf’s regime with Zardari and Nawaz regimes. For Comparison of Zardari’s regime with Musharraf and Nawaz regimes, the Mean Difference (I-J) scores appeared as: Musharraf .563^*, Nawaz -.325^*. The 0.000 significance of difference between Zardari and Musharraf is a high level of significance. Significance of difference between Zardari and Nawaz was noted as .005. It means that difference existed in media treatment by Zardari and Nawaz regimes, but it was less significant as that of the difference between Zardari and Musharraf regimes.

For Comparison of Nawaz’s regime with Musharraf and Zardari regimes, the Mean Difference (I-J) scores appeared as: Musharraf .888^*, Zardari .325^*. Standard Error fell as; Musharraf .097, Zardari .103. A significance level of 0.000 between Nawaz and Musharraf showed significant difference in comparison of Nawaz’s regime with Musharraf’s regime. Significance level of .005 difference between Nawaz and Zardari regimes means that difference existed in treatment of the media by Nawaz and Zardari regimes, but it was not as significant as that of the difference which existed between Zardari and Musharraf regimes.

Difference between Mean values in Comparison of Musharraf’s regime with other two regimes remained as 0.000 which expressed significant difference in media treatment by the Musharraf regime and other two regimes, but the difference between Mean values in Comparison of Zardari and Nawaz regimes remained as 0.005, which means less significant difference existed in media treatment by Zardari and Nawaz regimes. It indicated that   H-II is partially supported.

B- Qualitative Analysis

Reports from the Pakistani sources were 60 (66.7%) and from the global sources were 30 (33.3%), thus making a total number of 90. Further detail is below:




 

Table B-1. Source Category

Source	Source Category	Frequency	Frequency & Percent
Pakistani	APNS	15	60 (66.7%)
	CPNE	15
	P
	AUL 15 PDF	15
Global	IFEX	15	30 (33.3%)
	RSF	15
G. Total		90	90 (100.0%)

 




Table B-1 indicated that Pakistani sources were four, i.e., APNS, CPNE, PFUJ, PPF, and the global sources were two i.e. IFEX and RSF. Out of total 90 reports, 60 (66.67%) were of Pakistani sources and 30 (33.3%) were from foreign sources, 15 reports (5 from each regime) of each source were selected.




 

Table B-2. Adjectives Used in Reports

Adjectives	Frequency	Percent
Positive	5	5.56
Negative	70	77.78
Neutral	15	16.67
Total	90	100.00

 




Table B-2 indicates the types and frequency of adjectives used in reports. Use of negative adjectives was the largest i.e. in 70 (77.78%) reports, followed by neutral adjectives in 15 (16.67%) reports and positive adjectives appeared in the least number i.e. in 5 (5.56%).




 

Table B-3. Adjectives used by News Sources

Regime	Source Category	Reports	Adjectives	Frequency	Percent
Musharraf	APNS	05	Positive	1	20.0
			Negative	3	60.0
			Neutral	1	20.0
	CPNE	05	Positive	1	20.0
			Negative	3	60.0
			Neutral	1	20.0
	PAUL	05	Negative	5	100.0
	PDF	05	Negative	4	80.0
			Neutral	1	20.0
	IFEX	05	Negative	5	100.0
	RSF	05	Negative	5	100.0
Zardari	APNS	05	Negative	2	40.0
			Neutral	3	60.0
	CPNE	05	Negative	2	40.0
			Neutral	3	60.0
	PAUL	05	Positive	1	20.0
			Negative	3	60.0
			Neutral	1	20.0
	PDF	05	Negative	4	80.0
			Neutral	1	20.0
	IFEX	05	Negative	5	100.0
	RSF	05	Positive	1	20.0
			Negative	4	80.0
Nawaz	APNS	05	Positive	1	20.0
			Negative	2	40.0
			Neutral	2	40.0
	CPNE	05	Negative	3	60.0
			Neutral	2	40.0
	PAUL	05	Negative	5	100.0
	PDF	05	Negative	5	100.0
	IFEX	05	Negative	5	100.0
	RSF	05	Negative	5	100.0

 




Table B-3 depicts that during Musharraf’s era, all 5 (100%) annual reports of IFEX, RSF and PFUJ expressed negative adjectives. PPF used negative adjectives in 4 (80%). CPNE and APNS used negative adjectives in 3 (60% reports. During Zardari era, IFEX used negative adjectives in all 5 (100%) reports followed by RSF and PPF in 4 (80%) reports, APNS & PFUJ 3 (60%) and CPNE 2 (40%). During Nawaz’s regime, PFUJ, PPF, IFEX and RSF used negative adjectives in all 5 (100%) reports, CPNE in 3 (60%), while APNS in 2 (40%) reports. Neutral adjectives occurred as; Musharraf’s regime: APNS, CPNE & PPF 1 (20%) report each; Zardari’s regime:  APNS & CPNE, 3 (60%) reports each and PPF, PFUJ, 1 (20%) each, and Nawaz: APNS & CPNE, 2 (40%) and no neutral or positive adjective was used. Positive adjectives were rare as; Musharraf era: APNS & CPNE I (20%) report each; Zardari era: PFUJ & RSF I (20%) report each and Nawaz era: APNS 1 (20%) report. The extreme use of negative adjectives in most of reports shows suppression of media in all three regimes and thus offers an answer to Research Question-1.




 

Table B-4. Government's Treatment of Media

Regime	Government's Treatment of Media	Frequency	Percent
Musharraf	Anonymous Violence	2	6.7
	State's Suppression	17	56.7
	Court Cases	1	3.3
	Facilitation	4	13.3
	No coercion	6	20.0
	Total	30	100.0
Zardari	Anonymous Violence	7	23.3
	State's Suppression	12	40.0
	Facilitation	2	6.7
	No coercion	9	30.0
	Total	30	100.0
Nawaz	Anonymous Violence	8	26.7
	State's Suppression	18	60.0
	No coercion	4	13.3
	Total	30	100.0

 




Table B-4 shows that concepts such as state’s suppression and anonymous violence against the media appeared largely in all the three regimes. During Nawaz’s regime media suppression was noted in 18 (60%) reports along with anonymous violence in 8 (26.7%) reports. During Musharraf’s regime, state’s suppression was noted in 17 (56.7%) reports along-side anonymous actions in (6.7%) reports. During Zardari’s regime, minimal state’s suppression was noted as compared to Nawaz and Musharraf’s regimes, i.e., in 12 (40%) reports along with anonymous violence in 7 (23.3%) reports. These figures indicated that the media were suppressed during all the three regimes. 

C- Comparison of Quantitative & Qualitative Results

Further comparison between results of Quantitative and Qualitative Content Analyses was made while exploring the relationship between descriptive statistics of both techniques and making explanatory & exploratory review to investigate whether results of both procedures support or oppose each other’s conclusions.




 

Table C-1.  Comparison of Topics/Issues/Events with Adjectives in Reports

A-Quantitative Data  (Frequency of Topics/issues)			B-Qualitative Data (Freq. of Reports With Adjectives)
Topics/ Issues/Events	Frequency (No) & %	Overall No & % of Relevant Topics	Adjectives	Frequency & %
Coercion	473 (23.42%)	1404 (69.50%)	Negative	70 (77.78%)
Violence	563 (27.87%)
Regulation	120 (5.94%)
Irresp. Media	248 (12.28%)
Facilitation	304 (15.05%)	538 (26.63%)	Positive	5 (5.56%)
Resp. Media	234 (11.58%)
Other	78 (3.86%)	78 (3.86%)	Neutral	15 (16.67%)
Total	2020 (100%)	2020 (100%)	Total	90 (100%)

 




Table C-1 shows a comparison between the frequencies of topics/issues/events of quantitative analysis and adjectives used in reports selected for qualitative study. The overall number and percent of relevant topics/issues guiding towards media suppression is 1404 (69.50%). Similarly, the frequency and percent of category of qualitative data i.e. negative (adjective) which also signifies media suppression, is 70 (77.78%). The ratio of categories of quantitative data indicating media facilitation is 538 (26.63%), whereas, that of the qualitative data (positive adjective) is 5 (5.55%). The ratio of categories/concepts leading to worst media suppression at both sides of the table is far larger than the ratio of categories pointing to media facilitation.




 

Table C-2.  Comparison of Topics/Issues with Govt.’s Treatment of Media in Reports

A-Quantitative data (Frequency of Topics/issues)			B-Qualitative data (Frequency of Govt’s. Treatment of Media)
Topics/ Issues	Frequency (No) & %	Overall No & % of Relevant Topics	Govt’s. Treatment of Media	Frequency & %	Overall No & % of Relevant Topics
Coercion	473 (23.42%)	1404 (69.50%)	Anonymous Violence	17 (18.89%)	66 (73.33%)
Violence	563 (27.87%)		State's Coercion	47 (52.22%)
Regulation	120 (5.94%)		Court Cases	1 (1.11%)
Irresp. Media	248 (12.28%)		-----	-----
Facilitation	304 (15.05%)	538 (26.63%)	Facilitation	6 (6.67%)	25 (27.78%)
Resp. Media	234 (11.58%)		Resp. media	-----
Other	78 (3.86%)	78 (3.86%)	No coercion	19 (21.11%)
Total	2020 (100%)	2020 (100%)	Total	90 (100%)	90 (100%)

 




Table C-2 shows a comparison among the topics/issues/events of quantitative analysis and reports regarding concepts highlighting the government's suppression of the media sampled for qualitative study. The overall ratio of relevant topics/issues/events signifying media suppression is 1404 (69.50%). Similarly, the ratio of category of qualitative data (reports) about governments’ suppression of the media is 66 (73.33%). Both figures indicate a greater degree of media suppression. The figure about categories implying media-facilitation at Side-A of the table is 538 (26.63%), whereas, the contending figure at Side-B is 25 (27.78%). Both figures indicating media suppression are significantly larger than those suggesting favorable treatment.




 

Table C-3.  Comparison of Topics/Issues/Events with Tonal Qualities in Reports

Regime	A-Quantitative Data (Topics/Issues/Events)			B-Qualitative Data (Tonal Qualities)
	Topics/Issues/Events	Frequency & Percent	No. & %  of Rel. Topics	Tonal Qualities	Frequency & Percent	No & %  of Rel. Topics
Musharraf	Coercion	222 (29.2%)	524 (68.86%)	Aggressive	8(26.7%)	27 (86.7%)
	Violence	232 (30.5%)		Emotional	9(30.0%)
	Regulation	38 (5.0%)		Critical	9(30.0%)
	Irresponsible	32 (4.2%)		---	---
	Facilitation	141 (18.5%)	210 (27.60%)	Friendly	2(6.7%)	2(6.7%)
	Responsible	69 (9.1%)
	Other	27 (3.5%)	27 (3.5%)	Neutral	2(6.7%)	2(6.7%)
	Total	761 (100.0%)	761(100.0%)	Total	30(100.0%)	30(100.0%)
Zardari	Coercion	122 (20.1%)	408 (67.11%)	Aggressive	5(16.7%)	24(80%)
	Violence	178 (29.3%)		Emotional	7(23.3%)
	Regulation	34 (5.6%)		Critical	12(40.0%)
	Irresponsible	74 (12.2%)		----	----	----
	Facilitation	87 (14.3%)	177 (29.11%)	Friendly	3(10.0%)	3(10.0%)
	Responsible	90 (14.8%)
	Other	23 (3.8%)	23 (3.8%)	Neutral	3(10.0%)	3(10.0%)
	Total	608 (100.0%)	608 (100.0%)	Total	30(100.0%)	30(100.0%)
Nawaz	Coercion	129 (19.8%)	472 (72.50%)	Aggressive	6(20.0%)	25 (83.33%)
	Violence	153 (23.5%)		Emotional	8(26.7%)
	Regulation	48 (7.4%)		Critical	11(36.7%)
	Irresponsible	142 (21.8%)		---	---
	Facilitation	76 (11.7%)	151 (23.2%)	Friendly	1(3.3%)	1(3.3%)
	Responsible	75 (11.5%)
	Other	28 (4.3%)	28 (4.3%)	Neutral	4(13.3%)	4(13.3%)
	Total	651(100.0%)	651(100.0%)	Total	30(100.0%)	30(100.0%)

 




Table C-3 indicates that the ratio of topics suggesting media suppression during the Musharraf regime is 524 (68.86%) out of 761 and the ratio of reports with tonal qualities referring to the same situation is 27 (86.7%) out of 30. Ratio of categories specifying media facilitation during Musharraf era is 210 (27.60%) and 2 (6.7%) only which is very low as compared to the ratio indicating suppression. During the Zardari era, the quantitative data categories pointing to media suppression are 408 (67.11%) out of a total of 608 and the reports with such tonal qualities in qualitative data are 24 (80%). Both figures indicate a strong inclination towards media suppression. Other categories suggesting media facilitation are 177 (29.11%) in quantitative data and only 3 (10%) reports are in qualitative data. During Nawaz era, the quantitative categories with media suppression are 472 (72.5%) out of total 651 and reports in qualitative data with similar tonal qualities are 25 (83.33%). The quantitative figure signifying media facilitation is 151 (23.2%) and qualitative figure is 1 (3.3%) only. The quantitative and qualitative figures suggesting media suppression are dominantly greater than those which suggest media facilitation.




 

Table C-4.  Comparison of Frames in Items with Tonal Qualities in Reports

A-Quantitative Data (Frames in Items)			B-Qualitative Data (Tonal Qualities  in Reports)
Frames	Count & Percent	Count & % of relevant frames	Tonal Qualities	Count & Percent	Count & % of relevant frames
Govts’. Respons.	453 (22.4%)	1256  (62.18%)	Aggressive	19 (21.11%)	75 (83.33%)
Conflict	52 (2.6%)		Emotional	24 (26.67%)
Anti-govt.	604 (29.9%)		Critical	32 (35.56%)
Pro-Media	147 (7.3%
Facilitation	212 (10.5%)	285 (14.11%)	Friendly	6 (6.67%)	6 (6.67%)
Pro-govt.	73 (3.6%)
Media’s Respon.	270 (13.4%)	479 (23.71%)	---	---	---
Anti-Media	209 (10.3%		---	---	---
Neutral	---	---	Neutral	9 (10%)	9 (10%)
Total	2020 (100%	2020 (100%	Total	90 (100%)	90 (100%)

 




Table C-4 shows a comparison of frames in quantitative data with tonal qualities in reports of qualitative data. Frames indicating media suppression are larger, 1256 (62.61%) out of 2020 and reports of similar tonal qualities are larger, 75 (83.33%). Frames showing media facilitation are 285 (14.11%) and reports of similar tonal qualities are 6 (6.67%). 

Findings and Conclusion

Findings and results of the study are given below:

The first Research Question was about the amount of coverage provided to the suppression of media during the regimes of Musharraf, Zardari and Nawaz. It was found that genres predicting media suppression collectively made a sum of 1404 (69.50%) of the total 2020, thus heavily dominating the coverage during all regimes. The second Research Question enquired that which of the three regimes kept tight control over the media. Out of 563 genres about violence against media, the highest number of 232 (41.2%) items was reported during the Musharraf’s regime. Similarly in the category of “coercion” with 473 items, again the highest number of 222 (46.9%) genres was reported during Musharraf’s era. 

The first hypothesis presumed worst media suppression during the military regime of General Musharraf than that of the two civilian regimes of Zardari & Nawaz.  Results of One-way ANOVA showed the mean value during the Musharraf era as the lowest. Results of Welch and Brown-Forsythe Robust Tests for Equality of Means indicated a value of .000 of significant difference which proved that the media suppression during Musharraf’s regime remained highly worst.  However, the situation remained worst in all the three regimes. To know the significant difference in media treatment by all the three regimes, the Tukey Post Hoc Test of Multiple Comparisons was conducted, which indicated a significant difference of 0.000 between comparison of Musharraf’s regime with Zardari and Nawaz’s governments. A significant difference of 0.000 was also shown between Zardari and Musharraf’s regimes. Significance of difference between Zardari and Nawaz was noted as .005, which means that difference existed in suppression of media between Zardari and Nawaz regimes, but not as much significant as that of the difference between Zardari and Musharraf regimes. Thus H-II was partially supported.

Suggestions and Recommendations

In the light of this study, the following

suggestions and recommendations are proposed for future research.

1. This study explored suppression of the media during Musharraf, Zardari and Nawaz’s regimes. Many relevant issues such as the impacts of sudden political upheavals on the media in Pakistan or their relations with the government can be investigated in the future. 

2. A study on the role of official advertisements in shaping media-government relations in Pakistan can be conducted in the future. 

3. Many private News TV channels air popular current affairs and political talk shows in the evening. Studies may be conducted to investigate the impacts of Evening TV Talk Shows on Media-government relations or to explore various factors which influence the agenda-setting process of these TV talk shows. 




Implications of the Study

This study will be helpful for exploring relevant and prospective issues and topics in the future. Its findings and results will also be beneficial for media houses, editors and journalists. Moreover, this research work may also be used as reference material in literature reviews of future researches. It may also benefit the general public to get insight into the field of media-government relations in Pakistan. Finally, findings and conclusions of this study may also work as a guideline for policymakers and official media organizations.      

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